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Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
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Southeast Europe
Sebastian Leitner* and Mario Holzner*
Th   e article analyses the issue of economic inequality in the transition economies 
of Central, East and Southeast Europe. It consists of a literature review and a 
descriptive analysis as well as an econometric modelling exercise. In the ﬁ  rst part 
we point at the fact that the rise in income inequality was triggered by the mag-
nitude of transitional output loss and a reduction of formal employment. Rising 
wage inequality was at the core of total income dispersion, while government 
transfers had a redistributional function only in Central and Southeast Euro-
pean countries contrary to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 
the econometric analysis it is found that for instance public utilities infrastruc-
ture liberalisation has increased inequality in transition, while price and trade 
liberalisation has decreased it. A high share of employment in industry and high 
government expenditures are connected with less inequality.
JEL classiﬁ  cations: D63, O15, P36
Keywords: income distribution, inequality, transition economies
1. Introduction
Th   ere exists an enormous amount of economic literature on the general topic of inequality. 
A large variety of aspects of social and economic inequality have been looked at in great de-
tail – such as for instance: inequality and growth (e. g. Kuznets 1955, Ravallion 2001, Bena-
bou 1996, Deininger   /  Squire 1998, Alesina   /   Rodrik 1994, or Aghion et al. 1999), inequality 
and trade liberalisation (e. g. Milanovic   /  Squire 2005, Bhatta 2002), inequality and demog-
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raphy (e. g. Lam 1986, or Chu   /   Jiang 1997), inequality and health (e. g. Anand et al. 2005), 
inequality and migration (e. g. Black et al. 2005, Davies   /    Wooton 1992, Stark 2006  ), inequal-
ity and human capital (e. g. Chiu 1998), inequality and technological change (e. g. Acemoglu 
2002), inequality and government policies (e. g. Davies 1986, Lambert 1993, Benedict   /  Shaw 
1995). Th   ese contributions highlight diﬀ  erent notions of inequality (e. g. functional versus 
personal income distribution) as well as a number of explanatory factors mutually related 
to inequality. In addition there exists a wide literature on the measurement and explana-
tion of personal income distributions based on survey data (see Deaton 1997 for an over-
view). A more recent overview on general inequality issues is presented by Atkinson   /   Bour-
guignon (2000).
When looking speciﬁ  cally into the literature on inequality with a focus on transition 
economics it can be stated that one of the main papers in this ﬁ  eld was Branko Milanovic’s 
Explaining the Increase in Inequality During Transition ( Milanovic 1999). He ﬁ  nds that the 
most important factors driving overall inequality upwards are to be found in the ﬁ  eld of 
changing labour market outcomes. However, some authors argued that pre-transition Gini 
coeﬃ   cients were not correctly measured and did not properly consider the inequality in a 
shortage economy. In any case, although severe changes in income and welfare distributions 
occurred in the region, it does not appear that inequality in transition economies increased 
that dramatically as it was predicted by some authors at the beginning of transformation. 
Przeworski (1991) expected a convergence of the transition economies to the extremely high 
level of inequality observed in Latin America.
Although a rise in inequality can be observed in the whole region (see table 1),1 the 
situation diﬀ  ers from country to country, depending on the institutional heritages as well 
as the transition policies chosen. While the Gini coeﬃ   cients reported for the Central Euro-
pean countries except Poland remained, although rising, in the rather low range of Swe-
den and Austria, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania as well as Poland reached the level of 
Great Britain, being one of the Western European countries with the highest level of ine-
quality. Th   e Western Balkan countries except Macedonia share a level of inequality com-
parable to the one of Austria, whereas Russia’s rising Gini coeﬃ   cient as well as those of the 
CIS countries show a fast growing asymmetry in the distribution of income and wealth 
during transition.
We shall analyse the determinants of inequality in Central, East and Southeast Eu-
rope starting with factors inﬂ  uencing the changing distribution of wages, being at the core 
of economic inequality. Th   ereupon a broader view of the situation of income inequality of 
households shall be given.
Th   e situation of wage disparities was shaped by enormous and still ongoing chang-
es in the labour markets of the Eastern European countries, driven by transitional reces-
sions and by enormous structural and sectoral shifts in the period of recovery from the mid 
1  Table 1 presents Gini coeﬃ   cients based on disposable income. It shall be noted that a wide range 
of Gini estimates based on diﬀ  erent income or consumtion deﬁ  nitions exists.Leitner   /   Holzner:  Economic  Inequality  in  Central,  East  and  Southeast  Europe  157 
1990s onwards. Th   e way in which these changes were driven as well as accompanied by 
macro-economic policies (monetary and ﬁ  scal policies – on the revenue as well as on the 
expenditure side) aﬀ  ected the situation of the labour force. Furthermore structural poli-
cies, e. g. in the ﬁ  eld of trade and foreign direct investment ( FDI ), inﬂ  uenced the transition 
paths in the region. Direct impacts on distributional outcomes are resulting from country-
speciﬁ  c modiﬁ  cations of labour market regulations, ranging nowadays from the almost non-
existence of collective agreements in the Baltic states to Continental European-oriented 
labour market policies e. g. in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Along with the liberalisa-
tion of labour market regulations socio-demographic factors (e. g. gender, ethnicity, educa-
tion) regain importance in describing the emerging picture of wage distribution.
Th   e broader view on income and wealth inequality as a whole directs the attention to 
structural policies in the ﬁ  eld of privatisation as well as changes in the ﬁ  eld of social trans-
fer systems. Furthermore the privatisation of (formerly) public services in the ﬁ  eld of pen-
sions and reduced public expenditure in health care, education and other ﬁ  elds change the 
structure of provision of these services and are expected to inﬂ  uence future developments 
in income distribution.
Th   e research is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a descriptive analysis and 
a literature review. In chapter 3 we estimate an econometric model explaining inequali-
ty in transition countries using a general to speciﬁ  c approach. A conclusion is provided in 
chapter 4.
2. Descriptive Analysis and Literature Review
In this chapter we give an overview of the ongoing discussion on the development of in-
come inequality in the transition countries and analyse the possible reasons for the observed 
increase of inequality.
2.1 Income Distribution in the Era of Socialism
To qualify the changes in income inequality during the period of accelerated transition as 
well as the recent situation it seems appropriate to take a look at the dispersion of earnings 
at the point of departure in the 1980s. Generally spoken in the post World War II period 
earnings dispersion fell until the beginning of the 1980s in the Soviet Union and Central 
Europe. From that time on slight increases were reported for Hungary as well as the Soviet 
Union (Atkinson   /   Micklewright 1992).
Decile ratios2 in the Soviet Union of monthly earnings had always been much high-
er compared to other COMECON countries. One reason was that average monthly earn-
2  Ratio of the relative wage of the individual who receives higher earnings than 90 percent of all 
individuals but less than the richest ten percent and the relative wage of the individual with earnings 
higher than those of the lowest ten percent and below the richest 90 percent of all individuals.158 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
ings diﬀ  ered between highly developed Soviet republics and economically backward ones. 
In 1989 average earnings in Estonia came up to 104 percent compared to Russia, while in 
Azerbaijan they made up only 69 percent. Earnings decile ratios at the end of the 1980s in 
the Czech Republic as well as in Hungary were with about 2.5 in line with those in Germa-
ny, in Poland (2.8) somewhat lower than in France and in Russia (3.4) comparable to Brit-
ain at that time ( Flemming   /   Micklewright 1999).
Th   e picture of household incomes per capita reveals that ﬁ  scal instruments had a damp-
ening inﬂ  uence on inequality in most of the socialist countries. In the mid-1980s Gini co-
eﬃ   cients for the individual distribution of per capita income were in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary with 0.20 and 0.21 somewhat lower than those for Finland and Sweden, followed 
by Russia and Poland. Other Scandinavian and Benelux countries as well as Germany all 
had Gini coeﬃ   cients below 0.30, while the USA was the OECD country with the largest 
income dispersion of 0.37. Within the Soviet Union the western republics of Ukraine, Be-
larus and Moldova had Gini coeﬃ   cients of about 0.24, which were somewhat lower than 
those for Russia and the Baltic republics (0.27). Dispersion of per capita household incomes 
of most of the Central Asian republics as well as the Caucasian republics was only somewhat 
higher compared to Russia (except Armenia which had the same low level Gini coeﬃ   cient 
as Moldova). However we have to keep in mind that the quality of the household surveys 
performed in Soviet republics was reported to be lower than in other COMECON states 
since a sample bias towards families of persons working in state enterprises and collective 
farms resulted in a reduction of variances (Atkinson   / Micklewright 1992, Flemming   /  Mickle-
wright 1999, World Bank 2000).
Th   roughout the article we try to use net-income-based Gini coeﬃ   cients (as well as 
other inequality measures) instead of consumption-based measures. Income-based coeﬃ   -
cients have the advantage that they are more easily available on a comparable basis. Con-
sumption-based Gini coeﬃ   cients report somewhat higher inequality levels compared to in-
come-based ones for Central European countries, since non-reported income is revealed in 
consumption ﬁ  gures. In some CIS countries like Armenia, Georgia or Tajikistan the con-
sumption-based Gini coeﬃ   cients are considerably lower than the income-based ones. One 
important reason for this is that wages as a component of total income fell by large during 
transition in CIS countries. Since income from self-employment and other sources of non-
wage income are prone to volatility as well as errors in measurement, consumption- and 
income- based Gini coeﬃ   cients vary by large (    World Bank 2000). An in-depth overview 
on methodological issues as well as pitfalls when working with inequality measures of tran-
sition countries is given by Flemming   /  Micklewright (1999).
2.2 Recent Picture of Income Inequality in the Region
In the following the recent situation of inequality in Central, East and Southeast Europe as 
well as its development since 1990 will be analysed taking into account the profound po-
litical, economic as well as social transition having occurred in Eastern Europe from the 
breakdown of the communist regimes onwards.Leitner   /   Holzner:  Economic  Inequality  in  Central,  East  and  Southeast  Europe  159 
Although a rise in inequality can be observed in the whole region, the situation diﬀ  ers 
from country to country, depending on the institutional heritages as well as the transition 
policies chosen. Looking at the development of average inequality in the three main coun-
try groups of the formerly socialist region analysed here, we see that in all of these the lib-
eralisation of markets led to a sudden rise in income dispersion (see ﬁ  gure 1). Th  e  change 
was most dramatic in the CIS region, with Russia experiencing the strongest increases after 
the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Figure 1: Development of Inequality in CE and Baltics, SEE and CIS, 1989      –      2003 
(  left scale: unweighted averages of Gini coeﬃ   cients; income based  )
Source: UNU-WIDER: World Inequality Database Version 2.0b, own calculations
Table 1 (  p.   160) reveals the large divergence of inequality development within the country 
group. While Belarus and Ukraine remained quite equal, the Caucasus region as well as 
Central Asian CIS countries experienced rising dispersion although the situation is rather 
mixed. In the region as a whole the strong rise in income inequality continued until 1996. 
Th   e subsequent reduction up to 1999 was followed by a halt in the aftermath of the Rouble 
crisis, but after 2000 when GDP growth revived the situation of inequality improved too.
In the Central European region the Czech Republic experienced only a slight rise and 
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compared to Scandinavian countries. Hungary and the Slovak Republic, where the devel-
opment in employment was less favourable, were aﬀ  ected by stronger but still modest in-
creases, in contrast to Poland, where a high share of self-employed, who work still by large in 
the agricultural sector, raises Gini coeﬃ   cients. Yet a large part of the increase in the average 
inequality of the country group in ﬁ  gure 1 is due to the fast rise in the Baltic states, which 
after gaining their national sovereignty adopted a quite liberal approach in restructuring 
their economy. Although the ﬁ  rst jump in the Gini index in the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s was 
followed by a rather stable development, we see a gradual but continuous rise of inequali-
ty up to 2003 in the group of countries that have joined the EU in 2004. A similar picture 
can be observed in the South East European countries. While Bulgaria and Romania also 
in part due to large agricultural sectors experienced a remarkable rise, in the Western Bal-
kan region a considerable stability can be found.
In the following we are going to analyse the macroeconomic development that inﬂ  u-
enced the inequality outcomes in the region. Furthermore we take a look at speciﬁ  c chang-
es in the structure of labour markets. Th   e overall inequality development of household in-
Table 1: Income Inequality in Transition Countries, Gini Indices (income-based  )
1990 2003
Czech Republic 19.7 22.8
Hungary 20.3 25.2
Poland 26.8 35.2
Slovak Republic 18.0 25.5
Slovenia 26.5 22.1











Serbia and Montenegro 31.7 30.02
SEE 28.9 31.3
1  Consumption-based due to lack of data; 2  Estimate; 3  2001; 4  1999.






Kazakhstan 29.7 n. a.
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comes per capita which is illustrated by the Gini indices presented above is shaped by tax 
and transfer policies diﬀ  ering from country to country as well as by further structural pol-
icies discussed below.
2.3 Th   e Process of Transition
Following the fall of the communist regimes in Central Europe in 1989 as well as the break-
up of the Soviet Union in 1991 in all of the countries sooner or later a series of reforms with 
the aim to transform the economic systems from socialist planning to market regulation 
were introduced. Th   ese comprised the liberalisation of internal markets as well as of external 
trade and ﬁ  nancial markets and the retreat of state inﬂ  uence from the production sphere via 
hardening the budget constraints of state-owned enterprises as well as their privatisation.
Although the political and economic process of transition always comprised a bundle 
of diﬀ  erent and sometimes conﬂ  icting policies varying from country to country the prob-
lems to be coped with were quite similar. Th   e way in which politicians, advisers and ana-
lysts thought about the modes of transition policy to be optimally chosen diverged in par-
ticularly with respect to the speed and depth of reforms to be taken at least in the period of 
early transition. Th   e proponents of »shock therapy« argued for fast liberalisation and priva-
tisation relying on market forces to establish nominal stability, which should subsequently 
foster growth via private investment.
Th   ose who advocated a gradualist approach pointed out that the adaptability of market-
agents (entrepreneurs as well as employees) is limited. Th   e conversion of institutional ca-
pacities from a communist to a market economy, being necessary to guarantee sustainable 
growth, would take time. Th   erefore a fast break-up of existing market structures should 
be avoided since this would lead to a substantial loss of output, jobs and thereby welfare 
in the short to medium run (      Jeﬀ   ries  2002,  Gabrisch   /   Hölscher  2006  ).  Th   e ex-post analy-
sis of more than a decade of transition shows that apart from the speed chosen concerning 
the liberalisation of prices, markets and property rights the building up of proper institu-
tions establishing a market economy was of crucial importance especially for the achieved 
outcomes in income inequality.
2.4 Loss in Output
Independently of the transition policies implemented, however, in all Central, East and 
South East European countries the liberalisation of markets, triggering a massive realloca-
tion of resources, led to a severe recession at least in the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s. However the 
magnitude of output losses and the time period of GDP decline varied considerably. Look-
ing at ﬁ  gure  2 ( p.  162) we can see that in Central European countries GDP growth already 
recovered between 1994 and 1995. Th   is is except for Poland, which could experience an up-
swing as early as 1992. For the Baltic states being highly integrated in the production sys-
tem of the Soviet Union before 1991, the break-up of the USSR and the reorientation to-
wards Northern and Western European markets led to a fall of GDP by almost 50 percent 162 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
although the recovery already started in 1995  / 1996. In some of the CIS countries like Rus-
sia, Ukraine and Moldova yet the bottom of output decline was not reached until the end 
of the 1990s with output losses of 45 percent on average. In the region of South East Eu-
rope, Bulgaria as well as Romania experienced an early recovery, which was yet followed 
by a further period of recession between 1994 and 1998. All republics of former Yugosla-
via obviously suﬀ  ered severely from the eﬀ  ects of the Balkan wars either directly or indi-
rectly via the break up of trade and production linkages and subsequently (and partly still 
existing  ) investment barriers. Th   e initial output loss of almost 55 percent in the region as 
a whole was followed by a growth performance which was insuﬃ   cient to reach the former 
level of GDP per capita.
In most of the Central European countries, however, the pre-transition level of GDP 
per capita was reached by the turn of the century, in Bulgaria, Romania as well as Croatia 
only by about 2005. In the CIS output still stagnated in the second phase of the 1990s with 
weighted average yearly GDP growth rates of 1.5 percent in European states as well as 2.8 
percent in the Central Asian region. From 2000 onwards a remarkable rebound of growth 
had been recorded. After the overcoming of the eﬀ  ects of the Russian Rouble crisis in 1998, 
supported by the rise in fuel prices as well as those for e. g. metals, average yearly growth 
rates jumped to 6.5 percent (2000 to 2005) in European CIS countries as well as to 8.8 per-
cent in those of Central Asia. However, only a few of the CIS countries managed to reach 
the GDP levels of 1990 again, especially Russia and Ukraine still lag behind.
Some authors yet claim that when comparing the pre- and post-communist output 
ﬁ  gures especially of CIS countries one tends to overstate the welfare reductions having tak-
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en place. One of the greatest problems hereby is that part of the economic activity report-
ed for pre-transition periods had a negative value added if inputs and outputs were priced 
at world market levels. Th   e adjustment of oﬃ   cial data could therefore lead to a reduction 
of measured output losses by 30 percent to 50 percent (  Havrylyshyn 2006    ). Nevertheless 
it is far from debatable that the break-up of the socialist system in Eastern Europe was fol-
lowed by severe reductions of average welfare in the region. Using oﬃ   cial data we can see 
in ﬁ  gure   33 the stronger severance but also diﬀ  erence in magnitude of the drop in GDP per 
capita within countries in the CIS region compared to Central Europe. Moreover the di-
verging growth performance in the second half of the 1990s and thereafter resulted in a wid-
ening of the welfare gap between countries (see ﬁ  gure 4, p.  164).
Not very surprisingly a strong correlation between output loss in the early phase of 
transition and the rise of inequality measures as the change of Gini coeﬃ   cient is found in 
the literature. Although some authors claim that this points to the correlation that the fast-
er the liberalisation the lower the inequality outcome in transition, this is far from conclu-
sive. Some countries like the Baltic states have transformed quite swiftly into liberal mar-
ket economies accompanied by fast rising inequality. Belarus on the other hand is one of 
the states in the region with the least will to transform and still experiences, like some other 
CIS countries, relatively low levels of inequality (Grün   /   Klasen 2001).
3 Th   e explanation of country codes can be found in the appendix.
Figure 3: Changes in GDP per Capita in Transition Countries, in  of 1990 




















































































change 1990 - lowest level in transition period change 1990-2004
Sources: World Development Indicators 2006, TransMONEE database 2007164 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
2.5 Reduction of Employment
Th   e transition crisis described above was accompanied by a massive reduction of employ-
ment and substantial underutilisation of labour in general (see table 2). As a consequence 
open unemployment, which did not exist as a mass phenomenon in the socialist era, rose, 
coupled with the emergence of diﬀ  erent types of informal economic activity. In particu-
lar in the CIS the sharp and persistent fall in labour demand of enterprises forced workers 
to move into low-productivity jobs in the service sector or subsistence agriculture, since in 
many of these countries social protection is lacking and the status of unemployment is not 
an aﬀ  ordable option. Moreover the prevalence of low-productivity jobs in unrestructured 
enterprises in CIS countries can be seen as a further type of underemployment.
In the whole region a reduction of formerly high employment to population ratios 
took place (see table 2), more rapidly in the Central European countries, while in the CIS 
the prolonged process of enterprise restructuring resulted in a delayed fall of employment 
rates later on. In the whole region not only the demand but also labour supply was reduced, 
e. g. of elderly persons taking advantage of early retirement schemes particularly in Central 
Euro pean countries as well as women, who had high employment rates compared to Western 
Europe in socialist times, but with reduced job opportunities their share in the labour force 
shrank (  World Bank 2005a). While men more often tried to prevent long-lasting stances of 
unemployment by moving into self-employment, especially low educated women were likely 
to drop out of the work force. However diﬀ  erences between male and female employment 
rates did not increase enormously and declined in the phase of output recovery ( Heyns 2005).
Figure 4: Development of GDP per Capita in Transition Countries 
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Table 2: Labour Markets in Central, East and Southeast Europe in Transition
Employment rates Unemployment rates
1989 lowest level 2005 1996 2000 2005
in transition
Czech Republic 86.9 70.4 70.4 3.9 8.8 7.9
Hungary 83.0 56.5 61.2 9.9 6.4 7.2
Poland 74.7 54.8 55.8 11.5 16.0 18.5
Slovakia 79.6 59.8 60.4 11.3 18.8 16.2
Slovenia 74.5 62.6 72.9 7.3 7.2 5.8
Central Europe  7 78.3 59.8
Estonia 87.9 68.7 70.5 9.9 13.6 10.7
Latvia 85.01 64.1 70.1 20.7 14.4 n. a.
Lithuania 83.9 63.5 67.0 16.4 16.4 8.3
Baltics  7 85.1 68.7
Bulgaria 81.5 54.7 59.4 14.1 16.9 10.1
Romania 77.4 65.0 65.4 6.7 7.1 7.2
Albania 75.0 47.9 48.8 12.4 16.8 14.34
Bosnia and Herzegovina . . 44.02 .1 6 . 1 5 23.82
Croatia . 55.6 55.6 10.0 17.0 12.3
Macedonia . 39.9 39.9 31.9 32.2 37.3
Serbia and Montenegro . 50.8 47.02 17.7 17.1 .
Western Balkan  7 .4 7 . 6
Belarus 84.2 67.0 67.0 4.0 2.1 1.5 4
Moldova 81.0 54.0 54.5 . 8.5 7.3
Russia 83.6 63.0 69.8 9.7 10.6 7.2
Ukraine 83.2 65.3 67.0 7.6 11.7 7.2
Armenia 76.1 52.0 52.3 9.3 11.7 8.24
Azerbaijan 68.8 68.8 70.5 . 12.85 .
Georgia 82.0 57.4 65.1 . 10.3 12.62
European CIS  7 82.9 68.6
Kazakhstan 82.6 67.1 74.0 . 10.45 8.1
Kyrgyzstan 74.3 60.9 60.9 . 13.96 8.52
Tajikistan 72.5 52.1 55.5 . 9.36 7.42
Turkmenistan 77.9 72.0 82.03 .7 . 7 5 .
Uzbekistan 72.0 63.7 63.9 0.3 0.4 0.34
Asian CIS  7 76.5 67.2
1  1990; 2  2004; 3  2003; 4  Registered unemployment rate – national methodology; 5  2001; 6  1999; 
7 Weighted  averages.
Sources: TransMONEE Database 2007, wiiw Database166 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
Although a rebound of growth took place in the Central European States and the Bal-
tics in the mid 1990s this was not accompanied by a rise in employment ﬁ  gures for a longer 
time (see table 2). Strong productivity growth led to further falling or stagnant employment 
rates until about 2005 in general, with the exception of Hungary and Slovenia. In Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus improvements from 2000 onwards are visible. Although an improve-
ment took also place in low-income CIS countries, labour markets there still resemble in 
many respects those in low-income countries in other world regions with a dominant in-
formal sector and widely spread underemployment (  World Bank 2005a).
2.6 Changing Structures of Employment
Th   e fall of labour demand as well as the liberalisation of labour market regulations were ac-
companied by the emergence of all kinds of less regulated forms of employment, be it in the 
form of temporary contracts, part-time work or self-employment in the sphere of the formal 
economy. Th   e elimination of legal restrictions on private business activity and ownership gave 
rise to self-employment throughout former socialist countries. Th   e magnitude and reasons 
for that were very diﬀ  erent, however. In Central European countries except for Poland and 
Western Balkan states it is mainly the emergence of small-scale entrepreneurial activities that 
led to a rise of the shares of self-employment in 2004 by between 12 percent in the Slovak 
Republic and 19 percent in the Czech Republic, a level comparable with Western European 
countries (15 percent). In Poland and Romania the large small-scale farming sector is mirrored 
by a share of self-employment of about 29 percent and 46 percent, respectively, at that time.
Contrary to Central Europe the severe recession in the CIS resulted in a much deeper 
collapse of jobs and wages in the formal sector, which forced employees to move into small-
scale farming or petty trade. Th   ese activities were often done in parallel to formal, low-pay-
ing or non-paying jobs. Th   e latter was common in the CIS since in the course of delayed 
enterprise restructuring personnel was not laid oﬀ   but instead just the payment of salaries 
suspended. A similar type of coping of enterprises with ﬁ  nancial diﬃ   culties were wage ar-
rears that concerned a large part of employees in the private but also in the public sector up 
to the turn of the century (  World Bank 2000 and 2005a).
From ﬁ  gure 5 we can see that increases in inequality measures and diﬀ  erences in ine-
quality levels between countries were shaped by the changing structure of functional income 
distribution. Th   e higher the share of wage earnings in countries of the region, the lower is the 
income dispersion in general. In addition between 1995 and 2002 the correlation of the share 
of compensation of employees in GDP and the Gini index has become more pronounced.
Irrespective of the concrete liberalisation of labour market regulations, in most of the 
countries especially low-skilled workers were aﬀ  ected by ﬁ  rm closures or by reductions of 
the labour force in the course of enterprise restructuring, the chance to ﬁ  nd a job in the 
formal sector was pretty low. Th  e  eﬀ  ect was that many of these had to move into informal 
jobs, thereby reducing their wage costs by avoiding the tax wedge. In the Central European 
countries and the Baltics the informal sector is estimated to comprise between 15 percent 
and 35 percent of the work force, which is twice as large as in the economically advanced Leitner   /   Holzner:  Economic  Inequality  in  Central,  East  and  Southeast  Europe  167 
EU-15 region. Estimations for the South European countries range between 25 percent and 
35 percent. Figures for the CIS countries where 35 percent to 55 percent of the labour force 
are expected to work in the informal sector reﬂ  ect that a large part of the population had to 
recourse to subsistence agriculture to make a living (  World Bank 2005a).
2.7 Rising Disparities in Labour Earnings
Th   e situation of wage disparities was shaped by the enormous and still ongoing changes in 
the labour markets of the Eastern European countries, driven by transitional recessions and 
by outstanding sectoral and structural shifts in the period of recovery from the mid 1990s 
onwards. Along with the liberalisation of labour market regulations, factors like e. g. the 
educational attainment level, ethnicity or gender of the individual employees regained im-
portance in describing the emerging picture of wage distribution.
As a result wage disparities rose above the average OECD level in most of the countries 
in the region. In the early phase of transition reported concentration coeﬃ   cients4 for wages 
4 Th   e concentration coeﬃ   cient of wages measures how evenly they are distributed in relation to 
total income inequality. Negative values indicate that wages are reducing income inequality, positive 
values that wage inequality raises overall inequality.
Figure 5: Correlation of Functional Distribution and Inequality in Transition Countries; 
CE & Baltics, SEE and CIS (  left scale: Gini coeﬃ   cient; lower scale: 
compensation of employees, in percent of GDP)
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have risen from 0.23 (in the late 1980s) to about 0.32 (in 1995) in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia 
and Bulgaria and from 0.25 to 0.50 in the countries of the former Soviet Union (  World Bank 
2000). Th   e disparities have also risen thereafter. While in the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
in 2002 the ratio of wages of the 9th decile to the 1st decile is with 3.5 the same as that of 
the OECD average, ﬁ  gures for Hungary and Poland are in between four and ﬁ  ve. Bulgaria, 
Romania as well as Lithuania and Estonia range between ﬁ  ve and six like the Ukraine and 
Belarus. Almost all other CIS countries have much higher disparities with decile ratios be-
tween seven and 14 and Russia exceeding a ratio of ten (  World Bank 2005a).
Wage decompression has had the largest impact on the increase of total income ine-
quality in Central, East and South East Europe, which is underlined in the literature ( Mi-
lanovic  1999,  Mitra   /   Yemtsov  2006  ).  Inequality  not  only  rose  between  population  groups 
reliant on their status in the labour market. Independently of the speed of reforms, labour 
earnings disparities rose in all transition countries (  World Bank 2000).
In countries where the shares of employees in total employment fell by large like in the 
low-income CIS this was a major driving force since incomes derived from self-employment 
are more unequally distributed. Looking at the data for CIS countries in the years 1998 to 
2003 a turnaround can be detected, since a rise in the number of wage earners and the end 
of widespread wage arrears reduced income inequality (  World Bank 2005c).
One of the most important factors that was driving the rise in wage inequalities in the 
Central European states is to be found in the increase in wage premiums to education es-
pecially in the emerging private sector (  World Bank 2000). As a result returns to education 
nowadays tend to exceed those to be found in OECD countries, whereby the speed of re-
forms within countries has positively inﬂ  uenced the existing premium diﬀ  erences (  Fleish-
er et al. 2004; Tonin 2006  ). For low-skilled workers not only did the probability of getting 
unemployed rise dramatically, but moreover many of those left the labour force completely. 
Th   erefore the activity rates of low-skilled fell by large, especially when compared to the situ-
ation in the EU-15 ( Landesmann   /   Vidovic 2006  ). In addition absolute income levels wors-
ened substantially, whereas highly educated employees often experienced real wage growth 
early after the rebound of output growth. In the CIS where labour turnover in general and 
the growth of private sector employment was low, the rise in returns to education was more 
reluctant and set in only later (  World Bank 2005a).
Although self-employment rose in total in all East European countries, its share in to-
tal income changed only slightly in the transition period in Central European countries, 
since here private economic activity could evolve already throughout the 1980s. Milanovic 
(1999) reports a rise from 20 percent at the end of the 1980s to 24 percent in 1995 on aver-
age. However in former Soviet Union Republics where private entrepreneurs could start 
their business only later on the average share of income derived from self-employment rose 
dramatically in the same period from nine to 25 percentage points. Th   e concentration of 
incomes derived from self-employment rose only in some of the Central European coun-
tries, being only a negligible source of rising inequality, whereas especially in Russia as well 
as in other CIS countries concentration coeﬃ   cients roughly tripled from 0.17 to 0.50 ( Mi-
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2.8 Th   e Role of Labour Market Institutions
Th   e institutional setting of wage bargaining changed dramatically in the countries of Cen-
tral, East and South East Europe. In the socialist era most workers in the region were au-
tomatically members of a union. In most transition countries union density and coverage 
rates of collective agreements declined substantially, although there are clear variations be-
tween countries. In CIS countries oﬃ   cial density rates are reported to have remained high, 
between 55 percent and 90 percent of the work force in the early 2000s, although these ﬁ  g-
ures tend to be inﬂ  ated (Crowley 2005, World Bank 2005a).
In Central European countries and the Baltics density rates as well as coverage rates, 
which amounted to 85 percent and 90 percent in 1989, dropped to about 30 percent and 50 
percent on average although individual countries like e. g. Lithuania with a coverage rate of 
about 12 percent and Slovenia were it amounts to more than 90 percent experienced sub-
stantially diﬀ  erent developments. In general collective bargaining coverage in Central and 
Eastern European member states of the EU nowadays is poor compared to Western Europe, 
with collective bargaining taking place mainly at the company level with only a minor role 
for industry or sector organisations. Extension mechanisms are reported to be weak, poor-
ly enforced or non-existent ( Lawrence   /   Ishikawa 2005).
Since the impact of union activity as well as collective agreements on inequality out-
comes is not always clear we tried to look at the relationship with respect to new EU mem-
ber states as well as Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania (see ﬁ  gures 6 and 7, p.   170). An exten-
sion to additional Southeast European countries and the CIS was not possible due to data 
availability.
We ﬁ nd a strongly negative linear correlation between union density and inequality in 
the countries of the 2004 EU accession round, which is reduced when the sample is extend-
ed by Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia (see ﬁ   gure 6  ). Th   e correlation between coverage rates 
of collective agreements and inequality is as striking. Removing Slovenia from the sample 
even aggravates the negative correlation and raises the ﬁ  t of the regression line ( R²). When 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia are excluded the results remain very similar (see ﬁ  gure 7).
2.9 Regional Dimension of     Wage Inequality
Wide regional variations characterise the recent situation in labour markets in the CEE 
region. Th   is is not only due to transitional recessions hitting regions at diﬀ  erent magni-
tudes. In part it is routed in the planning mode of industrial production having prevailed 
in the command economies. Concentration of production and specialisation of regions on 
a handful of industries and products brought along disparities in regional production struc-
tures and value added, which, however, was not mirrored by diﬀ  erences in living standards, 
since redistribution via price and wage controls equalised incomes. With the liberalisation 
of prices and markets combined with the reduction of state intervention and subsidies an 
unbalanced adjustment process set in. Regions which were specialised in heavy industry 
or agricultural production or were oriented towards the Soviet market were hit hardest. In 170 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
Figure 6: Correlation of Union Density and Inequality in Transition Countries, 2001 
(  left scale: Gini coeﬃ   cient; lower scale: union density)
Sources: Schroeder (2004), UNU-WIDER: World Inequality Database Version 2.0b
Figure 7: Correlation of Coverage Rate of Collective Agreements in Transition Countries, 
2001 (  left scale: Gini coeﬃ   cient; lower scale: coverage rate of collective agreements)
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contrast capitals and other metropolitan areas, which beneﬁ  ted from the growth in service 
sectors, could cope more easily with the ongoing transitions.
Furthermore those regions which where specialised in the production of consumer 
goods or in sectors which attracted FDI already early in transition and had the advantage 
of geographical proximity to western markets were better oﬀ  . As a result regional dispari-
ties rose concerning employment and unemployment rates and to a lesser extent also wage 
rates of employees (   Tonin 2006, Mitra   /   Yemtsov 2006  ).
2.10 Gender Inequality
Surprisingly wage diﬀ  erences narrowed between women and men during the 1990s. One 
reason for this was that although high participation rates of both women and men were 
fostered in the socialist era, women were underrepresented in heavy industry and other sec-
tors, which were highly rewarded in COMECON countries. With the liberalisation of la-
bour markets those skills acquired above-average by women, like business qualiﬁ  cations or 
the command of foreign languages, turned out to pay oﬀ   better than before. Sectoral em-
ployment shifts from industry to services favoured women, who prevailed in these sectors 
already in communist times. Another reason already mentioned above was that especially 
low-skilled women dropped out of the labour force more likely than men, so that the ratio 
of average wages of women and men increased. As a consequence gender wage gaps nar-
rowed ( Heyns 2005). Although the reduction of earnings diﬀ  erences in transition made up 
only for a part of the gender wage gap, we have to conclude that it has contributed nega-
tively to the general rise in income inequality in the region.
2.11 General Income Inequality and Wealth Inequality
Th   e broader view on income and wealth inequality as a whole directs the attention to struc-
tural policies in the ﬁ  eld of privatisation as well as changes in the ﬁ  eld of social transfer sys-
tems. Diﬀ  erent country experiences in the change of ownership of ﬁ  rms as well as land and 
real estate led to diﬀ  erent outcomes in wealth (as well as wage) distribution. Furthermore 
the privatisation of (formerly) public services in the ﬁ  eld of pensions, health care, educa-
tion and other ﬁ  elds changes the structure of provision of these services and is expected to 
have an inﬂ  uence on the future development of income distribution.
2.11.1 Transfers and Tax Policy
Government taxes and transfers have inﬂ  uenced the distribution of incomes in Central and 
Eastern European countries by large throughout transition. In Central European countries 
social transfers have dampened the rise in income inequality in general. Th  roughout  the 
1990s public social spending as a share of GDP remained relatively stable at levels compa-
rable to Western European states. At the end of the 1990s the ratio of public expenditure to 
GDP amounted to 13.5 percent on social protection, ﬁ  ve percent on education and ﬁ  ve per-
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fers had a reducing eﬀ  ect on total inequality. For the early period of transition Milanovic 
(1999) concludes that this was mostly due to the introduction of unemployment beneﬁ  ts, 
whereas in some countries the ﬂ  attening of the pension schemes but also the possibility to 
leave the workforce via early retirement may have curbed the increase in inequality (  World 
Bank 2000). Analysing data of the Luxembourg Income Study (  LIS) database on Central 
European countries as well as Romania and Estonia, Cerami (2003) states that poverty rates, 
measured as 60 percent of average income, would have doubled from about 15 percent to 
almost 30 percent on average given the absence of social transfers.
In CIS countries the picture looks quite diﬀ  erent. Th   e fall in government revenues and 
subsequently expenditures to below 30 percent of GDP caused not only an absolute but 
also a relative reduction of social expenditure to GDP. At the end of the 1990s 7.5 percent 
of GDP were spent on social protection, about four percent on education and 3.5 percent 
on health in CIS countries on average, with much lower rates for most low-income CIS 
countries ( Klugman et al. 2002). Subsequently the impact of transfers to reduce increased 
income inequality in the post Soviet region has been marginal, in some countries especial-
ly in Russia the rising concentration of pensions had even an aggravating eﬀ  ect on income 
dispersion (  World Bank 2000). Cerami (2003) reports that total social transfers reduced the 
inequality of incomes measured by the Gini index by only 14 percent in Russia in 2000.
Information on the inﬂ  uence of changing tax structures on income inequality is less 
easily available. In all of the Central and East European countries at the beginning of the 
transition the tax systems relied heavily on direct taxation, so that tax revenues were re-
duced by large with the fall in output ﬁ  gures. A stabilisation of revenues was obtained with 
the introduction of value added taxes throughout the region, which made up a much larger 
share in total tax revenues of Central European countries at the end of the 1990s compared 
to Western Europe ( Leibrecht   /   Römisch 2002). Although we know that indirect taxes have 
a regressive eﬀ  ect, it does not inﬂ  uence the dispersion of disposable income but only wel-
fare levels. Th  e  eﬀ  ect of the value added tax on welfare diﬀ  erences of income groups, how-
ever, as far as we have seen is not considered in the literature on income inequality.
In the ﬁ  eld of direct taxation in Central European countries, the Baltics as well as Bul-
garia, Romania and Croatia a shift of the tax burden from enterprises towards individuals 
can be found. Furthermore many of the countries lowered the income tax rates of upper in-
come brackets, thereby reducing the redistributional eﬀ  ect of their tax systems. Estonia was 
the ﬁ  rst country to introduce a ﬂ  at income tax system, followed by Lithuania and Latvia, 
after 2000 also by Russia, Ukraine, the Slovak Republic, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
the Czech Republic. Since the shift towards a ﬂ  at tax system is most often combined with 
the broadening of the tax base and an increase of the basic allowance, it is not that clear-cut 
in advance how it changes the post-tax distribution especially between low and medium 
income earners, but high income earners are certainly better oﬀ  . Furthermore the change 
in the distributional impact of the income tax can be of small magnitude compared to that 
of an overall change of the revenue structure of the government ( Keen et al. 2006  ). For the 
development of tax systems in Central and Eastern Europe in total, we can conclude that 
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also be seen when looking at the progression of the tax wedge in the Central European and 
Baltic countries. While social contributions and taxes result in a burden of almost 40 per-
cent for low wage earners (50 percent of the average wage in manufacturing ) in these coun-
tries, in the EU-15 the burden is with 35 percent in 2003 somewhat lower and the distribu-
tional eﬀ  ect of total labour taxation substantially higher (  World Bank 2005b).
2.11.2 Privatisation and Wealth Inequality
Th   e transition of the communist countries towards market economies implied a large-scale 
transfer of formerly publicly owned assets into private hands. Th   e privatisation of small-
scale enterprises, which started ﬁ  rst, was ﬁ  nished by and large in the mid-1990s, while in 
general in the second half of the decade the privatisation of medium- and large-scale enter-
prises set in, coupled with the opening up towards foreign direct investors.
Privatisation was executed in diﬀ  erent ways ranging from voucher-based privatisation 
towards the sale of enterprises at market value to strategic (also foreign) investors. Voucher 
privatisation was used as primary method in the Czech Republic, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and most of the low-income CIS countries and should allow for a fast change of property 
rights and guarantee a broadly based ownership of assets throughout the population, which 
was often only achieved in the beginning of transition. Th   e sale to outsiders was done pre-
dominantly in Hungary and Estonia, while in Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Mace-
donia and Croatia as well as Ukraine and Uzbekistan the buyouts to the management and 
employees was the primary method chosen (  World Bank 2000).
In the literature no clear evidence has been found concerning possible correlations be-
tween the privatisation methods chosen and eﬀ  ects on inequality. Rather a clear diﬀ  erence 
can be seen between Central European and former Soviet Union countries. Th  e  former  suc-
ceeded in building up quite well functioning institutions shaping the interplay of market 
agents parallel to privatisation, which ended up in rather similar structures of ownership. 
In the latter the retreat of state inﬂ  uence led to a fast consolidation of property rights when 
assets changed hands from workers to managers or outside owners after privatisation. Fur-
thermore the so-called loans-for-shares programme in Russia transferred the ownership of 
the mining sector to banks below the market value. All in all this brought along a dramatic 
rise in wealth inequality with the emergence of large business groups owned by a handful 
of entrepreneurs, which are known as oligarchs today (Guriev   /   Rachinsky 2006  ).
Apart from enterprises also housing and land changed into private hands in the course 
of transition. At the end of the 1990s the share of housing owned by private persons ranges 
between 60 percent in Russia and about 95 percent in Lithuania. Th   e magnitude of private 
ownership is in general much higher compared to Western European countries. Most re-
searchers argue that housing privatisation appears to have had a progressive distributional 
impact even in CIS countries (  World Bank 2000). However, Yemtsov (2007) points out that 
the redistributional eﬀ  ect of housing privatisation has been overestimated in previous anal-
yses. He argues that housing has been a usual fringe beneﬁ  t prior to transition with those 
employees higher in the social hierarchy living in ﬂ  ats that realised higher market values af-
ter privatisation, when real estate prices began to rise and diﬀ  erentiate. He concludes that 174 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
the give-away of former state owned real estate below market value has entrenched or even 
aggravated the pre-transition divergence in housing wealth. Including imputed rents in the 
analysis would therefore worsen the picture of income inequality in the region.
However we should point out that since no comprehensive data exist on household 
wealth holdings in general it is not possible to assess in detail the magnitude of wealth in-
equalities resulting from the reallocation of property rights in the course of privatisation as 
well as the resulting eﬀ  ects they have on income inequalities in the region.
3. Econometric Model
In the following we estimate an econometric model in order to analyse the determinants of 
inequality in transition countries with respect to a set of explanatory variables, which are 
also prominent in the existing literature. Th  ey  reﬂ  ect transitional and structural change as 
well as public policy. However it has to be said that many of the variables tend to be overlap-
ping across these groups and cannot be assigned strictly to one of them. In our econometric 
analysis we do not test an existing theoretical model on purpose, as there is no clear theo-
retical framework to assess how inequality might change in transition, although Milanovic 
(1999) is one such approach. Nevertheless we try to start with as many variables as possible 
and apply a general to speciﬁ  c (GETS) approach. Th   e general model to be estimated is:
(1)  yx it it it =+ βε
' ,
where yit is the level of the Gini index for country i in year t and xit
'  is a vector of explanatory 
variables. Th   e error term is εit. Th   e actual choice of explanatory variables was driven by several 
factors. First, we wanted to use as many indicators of the descriptive part as possible. Th  ese 
are indicators such as employment, unemployment, structure of employment (e. g. share of 
employment in industry), government transfers and privatisation. Second, our choice was 
limited by the availability of these indicators across time and countries. Th   erefore we were not 
able to make use of e. g. unionisation data, which exist only as snap shots for a few countries 
in a few years. Finally, after collecting a considerable amount of potential explanatory variables 
we had to weed out those which were highly correlated with others in order to get rid of mul-
ticollinearity. In this stage we had to sort out for instance GDP per capita data, as it is highly 
correlated with a number of other variables. Th   e variables that survived this puriﬁ  cation proc-
ess are described in the following paragraph. All the data ﬁ  nally used were transferred in logs.5
We deﬁ  ned our sample to include data for 28 transition economies6 for the period of 
1989 to 2003, due to data availability. Our chosen indicator for income inequality is the 
5 Th   ree of the variables used, namely inﬂ  ation, real interest rate and change in labour productivity 
in industry, show also negative values. Th   erefore these variables were added to 100 before being loga-
rithmised.
6 Th   is includes eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), seven countries from Southeast Europe Leitner   /   Holzner:  Economic  Inequality  in  Central,  East  and  Southeast  Europe  175 
Gini index, taken from the WIDER database (for a detailed description of all the varia-
bles and their sources see Appendix). For almost all the transition economies data are only 
available up to the year 2003.
With regard to transitional change variables we found the following European Bank 
for Recovery and Development ( EBRD) indicators on: large-scale privatisation, small-scale 
privatisation, price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange system and infrastructure re-
form. We expect these ﬁ  ve liberalisation indicators to be rather positively correlated with 
inequality. Th   is is based on the idea of a trade-oﬀ   between eﬃ   ciency and equity during the 
process of reallocation of resources in transition. However, it is theoretically possible that 
reallocation can coexist with diﬀ  erent distributions.
To the next group of four variables we attribute the label public policy. From the 
EBRD database we have general government expenditure (in percent of GDP) as well as 
subsidies and current transfers (in percent of GDP). From the World Development Indi-
cators (    WDI  ) 2007 database we took data on inﬂ  ation and real interest rates. In the case 
of the two government expenditure variables we clearly expect a negative correlation with 
the Gini coeﬃ   cient. For the monetary policy indicators inﬂ  ation and real interest rate it is 
rather ambiguous. Here one could assume various eﬀ  ects on inequality.
In the ﬁ  eld of structural change we have found variables such as: change in labour pro-
ductivity in industry (from the EBRD), manufacturing value added (in percent of GDP), 
employment in industry (in percent of total employment). Th  e  ﬁ  rst indicator can be as-
sumed to be associated with a rise in inequality given the eﬃ   ciency-equity trade-oﬀ  , while 
the latter two ( both are from the WDI 2007) rather can be expected to have equalising eﬀ  ects 
since employees in industry tend to have a higher degree of trade union density than in the 
other sectors. We also included the WDI variable: exports of goods and services (in percent 
of GDP). If one believes globalisation to increase inequality then a high trade share should 
be related to a high Gini index, though one might believe that transition economies’ work-
force might actually gain from more trade openness given the countries’ relatively stronger 
labour intensity. We also included the employment rate (ratio between the total number of 
employed and the population aged 15 to 59 years) as provided by the TransMONEE 2007 
Database of the UNICEF-IRC. Here one would expect a negative relationship with regard 
to inequality. Th   e last two variables from this group are again from the EBRD database: 
unemployment (in percent of total labour force) and non-performing loans (in percent 
of total loans). Th  e  ﬁ  rst should be related with more inequality, while the latter might be 
assumed to be correlated negatively with the Gini index, as ﬁ  nancial crises tend to hurt own-
ers of income from capital in the ﬁ  rst place.
Th   e set of variables presented above appears to be exhaustive enough to estimate an 
econometric model explaining a great part of inequality in transition countries using a GETS 
approach. With respect to ﬁ  nding the right speciﬁ  cation to estimate the determinants of in-
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro), 
twelve former Soviet Union countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) and Mongolia.176 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
equality in transition we have to acknowledge that most probably the large dataset at hand 
suﬀ  ers from most of the possible shortcomings a panel data set in levels can have. We as-
sume the data to be suﬀ  ering from non-stationarity, endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Th   e Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root test shows that the Gini variable and 
most of the explanatory variables are not integrated of order one, but a few (e. g. the non-
performing loans variable) are. In any cases many of the variables appear to be near-non-
stationary. Th   e Wooldridge test for serial correlation and a likelihood-ratio test for heter-
oskedasticity seem to conﬁ  rm our initial doubts about autocorrelation and heteroskedas-
ticity in the panel. Th   is is probably the reason why, to our knowledge, nobody so far has 
tried to estimate a similarly large inequality explaining macroeconomic model on level pan-
el data in a proper way. Others try to overcome problems by estimating e. g. the change of 
inequality instead of the level (  Lopez 2003) or conﬁ  ne themselves to a limited set of vari-
ables (e. g. Jäntti      /      Jenkins 2001). One exception is Ivaschenko (2003) who also analysed a 
panel data set of transition economies (24 countries over the period 1989 to 1998). Using a 
simple ﬁ  xed eﬀ  ects model, he tries to explain the Gini coeﬃ   cient using eight variables. His 
focus is on the per capita GDP variable.
However, in our analysis we have to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Th   is is the reason why a simple ﬁ  xed or random eﬀ  ects model is not appropriate, but a Gen-
eralised Least Squares (GLS) model. In the GLS speciﬁ  cation we allow the autocorrelation 
to be panel-speciﬁ  c. Here one might think of country-speciﬁ  c business or transition process 
cycles. Th   is gives the model a touch of ﬁ  xed eﬀ  ects. In any case we are not only interested 
in the within content (as in Ivaschenko 2003) but also in the in-between information. Th  e-
oretically it would be also possible to use GLS with country dummy variables (GLSDV  ) .  
However in this case the coeﬃ   cient of the autocorrelation process would have had to be 
common to all the panels, which does not seem to make sense. In our GLS approach to es-
timate from general to speciﬁ  c we start with all the explanatory variables described above 
and eliminate step-wise the least signiﬁ  cant variable of each estimation.
Table 3 shows the results for the speciﬁ  cation, where all the estimated coeﬃ   cients are 
at least signiﬁ  cant at the ten percent signiﬁ  cance level. In fact, out of the original set of 16 
explanatory variables ten remain signiﬁ  cant at the one percent level and two at the ﬁ  ve per-
cent level. Th   e pseudo-R² of the model is at 61 percent. Due to many holes in the dataset 
the number of countries in the present regression has shrunk to 18 countries  7 with an aver-
age of 6.8 years  8 per country. Th   is makes a total of 122 observations in our regression.
As expected the infrastructure reform index shows to be positively correlated with the 
Gini coeﬃ   cient as it is probably related a lot to labour shedding and a loss of egalitarian 
wage structures, existing in former times in large public utility companies. Commerciali-
7 Th   e sample includes now still all the eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), only four coun-
tries from Southeast Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia) and only six former Soviet Union 
countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine).
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sation in the sensitive sectors of electricity, railways, roads, telecommunications, water and 
wastewater has led to an increase in inequality. Rather unexpectedly we ﬁ  nd the price liber-
alisation indicator to be negatively correlated with inequality. Probably this is related to the 
elimination of ineﬃ   cient monopolies and a general opening of the transition economies to 
new business. It can be assumed that giving up price regulation has also reduced the possi-
bilities for rent seeking of a few monopolists.
Also contrary to what one might believe following the globalisation critique, we ﬁ  nd 
a negative coeﬃ   cient of the trade and foreign exchange liberalisation indicator. Th   is is also 
one of the bigger coeﬃ   cients. Th   e interpretation is as follows. A one per cent increase in 
the trade and foreign exchange system liberalisation index leads ceteris paribus to a decrease 
of the Gini coeﬃ   cient of 0.23 percent. Th   us it seems that globalisation has left the average 
transition country with less inequality. Th   is is most probably due to the relatively more la-
bour intensive structure of the transition economies’ industry as compared to its western 
trade partners. Also the coeﬃ   cient of the share of exports of goods and services in GDP is 
negatively correlated with the Gini coeﬃ   cient. Export-based growth seems to be a strong 
job creator. Th   is could also be a proxy for small countries, which might tend to be more 
egalitarian for a number of reasons.
Table 3: GLS Panel Estimator of Inequality    1
Independent variables Coefﬁ  cients Standard 
errors
z-statistics P-values
Price liberalisation -0.244 0.102 -2.400 0.016
Infrastructure reform 0.094 0.038 2.510 0.012
Trade and foreign exchange system -0.230 0.085 -2.720 0.007
Exports of goods and services -0.138 0.038 -3.620 0.000
Employment in industry -0.179 0.040 -4.440 0.000
Change of productivity in industry -0.220 0.058 -3.770 0.000
Unemployment 0.080 0.024 3.370 0.001
Employment 0.203 0.078 2.600 0.009
General government expenditures -0.156 0.050 -3.150 0.002
Real interest rate 0.155 0.053 2.910 0.004
Inﬂ  ation 0.152 0.040 3.740 0.000
Non-performing loans -0.034 0.010 -3.310 0.001
Constant 4.380 0.714 6.130 0.000
Pseudo-R  ² 0.613
Number of observations 122
Number of countries 18
Average observation per country 6.778
1 Speciﬁ  cation: Hederoskedasticity and panel-speciﬁ  c AR(1) autocorrelation assumed.178 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
Employment in industry is negatively correlated with the Gini index. Our interpre-
tation is that all the three sub-sectors of the overall industry sector, namely: mining and 
quarrying, manufacturing, and electricity, gas and water supply, display a high level of trade 
union density and might thereby contribute to more equity. From the plain data we can ob-
serve that those countries which were able to preserve a large industry share in their econ-
omy during the transition, such as e. g. Slovenia, the Czech and the Slovak Republic, tend 
to have relatively low and stable levels of economic inequality. Th   is is probably because also 
the wage structure within the industry was preserved or at least changed only slowly. Th  e 
coeﬃ   cient of the change in productivity in industry variable has a negative sign too. Th  is 
seems to suggest that workers in industry can proﬁ  t from the improved economic develop-
ment in the transition countries via wage increases.
Another variable that behaved as expected is the unemployment rate. It stands for an 
increase in inequality. However, contrary to what might be expected we ﬁ  nd the employ-
ment rate to be positively correlated with inequality too. Th   is might be explained by the fact 
that especially some of the rather unequal former Soviet Union countries did not provide a 
decent level of social beneﬁ  ts (e. g. unemployment beneﬁ  ts and early retirement pensions) 
for those persons of working age who fell victim of the tremendous labour shake-out at the 
beginning of transition. Th   ese have to accept any type of work to survive (including subsist-
ence farming ), which explains the high employment rates in some of those countries.
General government expenditures behaved as expected. Th   ey had a dampening eﬀ  ect 
on inequality in transition. High real interest rates were found to go together with high in-
equality. Low real interest rates are likely to favour non-ﬁ  nancial investment, thereby creating 
new job opportunities, while high real interest rates increase the incomes of capital owners.
Th  e  coeﬃ   cient of the inﬂ  ation rate variable turns out to be positive. Th   is might be ex-
plained by the fact that persons with high income have more bargaining power and possibil-
ities to adapt to an increasing price level. Finally, the share of non-performing loans in total 
loans is also a crisis indicator, which represents those years in the second half of the 1990s 
when several transition economies passed through a banking crisis. It appears that the re-
spective coeﬃ   cient is negatively correlated with the Gini index. Th   is supports our assump-
tion that the ﬁ  nancial crisis of the late 1990s did rather hurt the rich capital owners.
Most of our results seem to support the descriptive analysis in the previous part of the 
paper. Th   is is especially true when it comes to indicators like for instance structure of em-
ployment (i. e. share of employment in industry) and level of unemployment.
Moreover the GLS model appears to be rather robust to adding or deleting single var-
iables from the sample. We did also test the chosen speciﬁ  cation for sub-samples. Table 4 
presents the equivalent model for the sub-sample of the CEE-8 countries (i. e. the Central 
European and Baltic countries). Half of the coeﬃ   cients become insigniﬁ  cant (signiﬁ  cance 
level of less than ten percent). Th   ese are the coeﬃ   cients of price liberalisation, infrastruc-
ture reform, trade and foreign exchange system, exports of goods and services, employment 
and non-performing loans. Th   is is probably the case because for these variables the CEE-8 
countries show less of a diversity. It is important to note that the coeﬃ   cients of the two in-
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and the inﬂ  ation variable remain signiﬁ  cant at the ﬁ  ve percentage level and do not change 
their signs. Th   us, in general our previous results are being conﬁ  rmed, with the exception 
that mainly the liberalisation and trade openness indicators do not show up signiﬁ  cantly 
which might be explained that due to the common EU-accession process especially these 
indicators appear streamlined across this region. Th   is does not mean that they had no im-
pact on inequality in transition, on the contrary. Th   is mainly shows the divide between the 
CEE-8 and the remaining sample, which is obviously also true for the variables employ-
ment and non-performing loans.
In order to remedy the possible deﬁ  ciencies concerning the non-stationarity or near-
non-stationarity of the estimated and explanatory variables as described above, we suggest to 
use the alternative speciﬁ  cation of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM ) dynamic 
panel estimator which is based on Arellano   /   Bover (1995) and Blundell   /   Bond (1998).9 Apart 
from the explanatory variables described above we introduce on the right hand side of the 
equation also the lagged variable of the left hand side (i. e. the lagged Gini coeﬃ   cient) fol-
9  Here we use the Stata software command xtabond2 ( Roodman 2006  ).
Table 4: GLS Panel Estimator of Inequality, CEE-8 Subsample      1
Independent variables Coefﬁ  cients Standard 
errors
z-statistics P-values
Price liberalisation -0.075 0.212 -0.360 0.723
Infrastructure reform -0.063 0.045 -1.400 0.161
Trade and foreign exchange system 0.116 0.207 0.560 0.573
Exports of goods and services -0.051 0.051 -1.000 0.317
Employment in industry -0.628 0.088 -7.120 0.000
Change of productivity in industry -0.405 0.093 -4.380 0.000
Unemployment 0.056 0.023 2.420 0.016
Employment 0.130 0.116 1.120 0.262
General government expenditures -0.229 0.059 -3.860 0.000
Real interest rate 0.306 0.130 2.360 0.018
Inﬂ  ation 0.236 0.111 2.120 0.034
Non-performing loans -0.019 0.013 -1.450 0.147
Constant 5.288 1.382 3.830 0.000
Pseudo-R  ² 0.639
Number of observations 74
Number of countries 8
Average observation per country 9.250
1 Speciﬁ  cation: Heteroskedasticity and panel-speciﬁ  c AR(1) autocorrelation assumed.180 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
lowing the logic of the model used. Th   ough the Gini indicator is not a unit root it seems 
to be near-non-stationary, which is the reason for its lagged inclusion. Th   us, equation (1) is 
augmented by yi,t− in the following way:
(2)  yy x it i t it it =+ + − αβ ε ,
'
1 .
Moreover this set of right hand side variables is also used as basis for the »GMM-style« in-
strument set. Here we employ for each time period all available lags of the speciﬁ  ed varia-
bles in levels dated t− or earlier as well as the contemporaneous ﬁ  rst diﬀ  erences as instru-
ments. Finally we estimate the regression assuming heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
within the panels. Here we re-run the GETS approach, starting with the full data set. As for 
the results only the coeﬃ   cients of the levels are being reported (see table 5).
Table 5: Arellano-Bover GMM Dynamic Panel Estimator of Inequality      1
Independent variables Coefﬁ  cients Standard 
errors
z-statistics P-values
Inequality (t-1) 0.859 0.038 22.780 0.000
Trade and foreign exchange system -0.035 0.021 -1.650 0.098
Manufacturing value added -0.075 0.024 -3.060 0.002
Change of productivity in industry -0.069 0.040 -1.710 0.088
General government expenditures -0.045 0.020 -2.240 0.025
Non-performing loans 0.010 0.005 2.250 0.025
Constant 1.220 0.284 4.290 0.000
Pseudo-R  ² 0.942
Number of observations 162
Number of countries 23
Average observation per country 7.040
1 Speciﬁ  cation: Heteroskedasticity and panel-speciﬁ  c AR(1) autocorrelation assumed; all explanatory 
variables used as endogenous GMM instrument in lags and ﬁ  rst diﬀ  erences.
Th   ese results are mainly conﬁ  rming the general outcome of our previous GLS results. How-
ever, several variables were lost in the GETS process (i. e. price liberalisation, infrastructure 
reform, exports of goods and services, employment in industry, unemployment, employ-
ment, real interest rate and inﬂ  ation). Th   is is mainly due to the quite demanding frame-
work of the GMM model, including the lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable. Most of the remaining coeﬃ   cients have lost a bit in signiﬁ  cance too. Especially the 
trade and foreign exchange system and the change of productivity in industry coeﬃ   cients 
are only at the brink of signiﬁ  cance at the ten percent level. Nevertheless there is also an ad-
ditional variable which appears to be signiﬁ  cant at the one percentage level in this setting. 
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place the employment in industry variable one would believe. However they are not that 
heavily correlated (0.56  ). Our interpretation is that it is not only important how many per-
sons are employed in industry but also how much they earn as a share in GDP. Also, gen-
eral government expenditures as well as non-performing loans remain signiﬁ  cant at the ﬁ  ve 
percent level. Interestingly enough, the sign of the latter changes as compared to the initial 
GLS model. Th   us we might assess the variable non-performing loans less robust. However, 
maybe it has to be seen rather as a pre-crises indicator.
We have also checked this speciﬁ  cation for robustness. Unfortunately it seems that 
the relationship is not extremely robust and multicollinearity could still be a problem. We 
therefore prefer the more robust GLS speciﬁ  cation of table 3. However, even this minimalist 
GMM model conﬁ  rms our main stories about trade liberalisation, a prosperous and strong 
industry and high general government expenditures to ﬁ  ght inequality in transition.
4. Conclusion
Th   e analysis of income developments in Central, East and Southeast Europe has shown that 
the severe transitional recession at the beginning of the 1990s not only had a direct impact on 
average per capita welfare, but also on income distribution. Stronger output losses were likely 
to raise income inequality. Th   e reduction of employment was accompanied by an increase 
in open unemployment in Central and South East Europe, whereas in most CIS countries 
informal activities spread in agriculture and services (eg. petty trade). Th  e  expected  corre-
lation between the share of compensation in GDP and the level of inequality in countries 
has been conﬁ  rmed. Th   e main reason for the increase in total inequality to be found in the 
literature especially in Central European countries is the decompression of wage structures. 
Wage dispersion has risen especially by educational attainment levels as well as by region by 
large. One reason for rising wage inequality can be found in the changing institutional set-
ting of wage bargaining. We found a negative correlation between coverage rates of collec-
tive agreements and the Gini coeﬃ   cient as well as for union density and the Gini for new 
EU member states. State transfers had a dampening eﬀ  ect on total inequality in Central and 
South East Europe during transition in general, while in the CIS the fall in total transfers 
as a share in GDP and the reduced progression of transfers increased total inequality. No 
clear evidence is available on how diﬀ  erent methods of privatisation have inﬂ  uenced the 
picture of inequality, except that those countries which managed not only to transfer former 
state property into private hands but also to build up functioning institutions establishing 
a market economy ended up with relatively lower inequality measures.
Our econometric analysis of the determinants of inequality in transition shows an ec-
lectic picture. In our preferred GLS setting, several transitional change-related indicators 
prove to be signiﬁ  cant. An inequality enhancing factor is public utilities infrastructure lib-
eralisation. On the other hand trade and foreign exchange liberalisation, as well as price 
liberalisation, show to be negatively correlated with inequality. Th   us one might conclude 
that diﬀ  erent types of     liberalisation and privatisation are inﬂ  uencing inequality in transi-182 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
tion to the extent that they are either increasing unemployment and wage disparities or on 
the contrary oﬀ  ering new job and business opportunities especially for the lower income 
population. Among the structural change related variables we ﬁ  nd exports of goods and 
services, employment in industry, change of productivity in industry and non-performing 
loans to be negatively related to inequality. Th  e  coeﬃ   cient of unemployment and employ-
ment has a positive sign. It appears that transition countries which preserved a prosper-
ous industry and were able to be competitive on foreign markets did also preserve a rather 
egalitarian society. Th   e puzzle of both high unemployment and high employment rates in-
creasing inequality can be solved by the fact that some of the rather unequal former Soviet 
Union countries did not provide a decent level of social beneﬁ  ts, which left a big mass of 
working poor, especially in subsistence farming. In the ﬁ  eld of public policy high real in-
terest rates and inﬂ  ation are inequality increasing, while general government expenditures 
have a dampening eﬀ  ect on inequality. It seems that in transition both a balanced mone-
tary policy combining low real interest rates and low rates of inﬂ  ation as well as an active 
stance towards public expenditures prove to be successful in ﬁ  ghting inequality. In general 
the preferred speciﬁ  cation proves to be rather robust and even more restrictive models show 
that the combination of trade liberalisation as well as a large and dynamic industry together 
with a strong state are related to less inequality in transition.
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Gini  Th   e Gini coeﬃ   cients for the respective countries and years were taken from diﬀ  er-
ent surveys. Only surveys that analysed income and in a very few cases consumption were 
used. Missing values of up to three years were interpolated. Source: United Nations Uni-
versity – World Institute for Development Economics Research (  UNU-WIDER) World 
Inequality Database Version 2.0b (  WIID 2b).
Transitional change
Large-scale privatisation  Th  e  EBRD Large-scale privatisation indicator is one of the 
EBRD’s overall transition indicators. It ranges from 1 (  little private ownership) to 4.33 
(standards and performances typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75 per-
cent of enterprise assets in private ownership with eﬀ  ective corporate governance.). Source: 
Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( EBRD).
Small-scale privatisation  Th  e  EBRD small-scale privatisation indicator is one of the 
EBRD’s overall transition indicators. It ranges from 1 (  little progress) to 4.33 (standards 
and performances typical of advanced industrial economies: no state ownership of small 
enterprises; eﬀ  ective tradability of land  ). Source: Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development ( EBRD).
Price liberalisation  Th  e  EBRD price liberalisation indicator is one of the EBRD’s overall 
transition indicators. It ranges from 1 (most prices formally controlled by the government) 186 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
to 4.33 (standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: complete 
price liberalisation with no price control outside housing, transport and natural monopo-
lies). Source: Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( EBRD).
Trade and foreign exchange system  Th  e  EBRD Trade and foreign exchange system indi-
cator is one of the EBRD’s overall transition indicators. It ranges from 1 (widespread im-
port and    /or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign exchange) to 4.33 
(standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of most tar-
iﬀ   barriers; membership in WTO). Source: Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development ( EBRD).
Infrastructure reform  Th  e  EBRD Infrastructure reform indicator is one of the EBRD’s 
infrastructure transition indicators. Th   e ratings are calculated as the average of ﬁ  ve infra-
structure reform indicators covering electric power, railways, roads, telecommunications, 
water and waste water. Source: Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(  EBRD).
Public policy
General government expenditure    General government expenditure is calculated in percent 
of GDP. Data for the general government, including local government and extra-budget-
ary funds, incorporated where available. Data for most countries are from IMF country re-
ports. Budget balance data can diﬀ  er from oﬃ   cial estimates due to diﬀ  erent budgetary ac-
counting, in particular with respect to privatisation revenues and foreign lending. Source: 
Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( EBRD).
Subsidies and current transfers    Budgetary subsidies and current transfers are calculated 
in percent of GDP. Budgetary transfers to enterprises and households are excluding social 
transfers. Source: Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( EBRD).
Real interest rate    Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inﬂ  ation as meas-
ured by the GDP deﬂ  ator. Source: World Development Indicators 2007 (  WDI 2007).
Inﬂ  ation  I n ﬂ  ation as measured by the consumer price index reﬂ  ects the annual percent-
age change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a ﬁ  xed basket of goods and serv-
ices that may be ﬁ  xed or changed at speciﬁ  ed intervals, such as yearly. Th  e  Laspeyres  formula 
is generally used. Source: World Development Indicators 2007 (  WDI 2007).
Structural change
Labour productivity in industry  Th   e change in labour productivity in industry in per-
cent is provided. Labour productivity is calculated as the ratio of industrial production to 
industrial employment. Changes in productivity are calculated on the basis of annual aver-
ages. Source: Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( EBRD).Leitner   /   Holzner:  Economic  Inequality  in  Central,  East  and  Southeast  Europe  187 
Manufacturing value added    Manufacturing value added is calculated as a share in GDP. 
Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the 
net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. Th   e origin of value added is determined by the In-
ternational Standard Industrial Classiﬁ  cation (  ISIC), revision 3: World Development In-
dicators 2007 (  WDI 2007).
Employment in industry    Employment in industry is calculated as a share of total em-
ployment. Employees are people who work for a public or private employer and receive re-
muneration in wages, salary, commission, tips, piece rates, or pay in kind. Industry corre-
sponds  to  divisions  2   –   5  ( ISIC revision 2) or tabulation categories C      –      F (  ISIC revision 3) 
and includes mining and quarrying (including oil production), manufacturing, construc-
tion, and public utilities (electricity, gas, and water) . Source: World Development Indica-
tors 2007 (  WDI 2007).
Exports of goods and services    Exports of goods and services are calculated in percent of 
GDP. Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market serv-
ices provided to the rest of the world. Th   ey include the value of merchandise, freight, in-
surance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, ﬁ  nancial, information, business, personal, and government services. Th  ey  ex-
clude labor and property income (formerly called factor services) as well as transfer pay-
ments. Source: World Development Indicators 2007 (  WDI 2007).
Employment  Th   e employment rate is calculated as the ratio between the total number 
of employed and the population aged 15 to 59 years. Source: TransMONEE 2007 Data-
base ( UNICEF-IRC, 2007).
Unemployment    Unemployment is calculated using end-year unemployment data as a 
share of total labour force. For most countries, data reﬂ  ect oﬃ   cial employment records from 
the labour registries. In many countries, small enterprises are not recorded by oﬃ   cial data. A 
number of countries have moved towards ILO-consistent labour force surveys in recording 
changes in labour force, employment and unemployment. Where available these data are 
presented. Source: Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (  EBRD).
Non-performing loans    Non-performing loans are calculated in per cent of total loans. 
Non-performing loans include sub-standard, doubtful and loss classiﬁ  cation categories of 
loans, but excludes loans transferred to a state rehabilitation agency or consolidation bank, 
end-of-year. Source: Th   e European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( EBRD).188 Intervention.  Journal  of    Economics
Country Codes and Abbreviations of Regions Used
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SEE – Western Balkan Albania ALB
SEE – Western Balkan Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH
SEE – Western Balkan Croatia HRV
SEE – Western Balkan Macedonia MKD
SEE – Western Balkan Serbia and Montenegro SCG
SEE – Western Balkan Montenegro MNE







CIS Republic of Moldova MDA





Abbreviations of Regions Used 
CE: Central Europe, SEE: South East Europe, CIS: Commonwealth of   Independent States